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Abstract: Transitioning towards organic consumption and production has 
been widely promoted as a more sustainable alternative for urban and 
rural food systems. Our paper shows how a focus on legitimacy can shed 
light on current barriers to deeper institutionalisation of the organic 
labelling scheme in China. Based upon documentary analysis, personal 
observations and over 70 qualitative interviews we identify consequential 
concerns amongst China's small scale farmers, limited support by the 
Chinese central government, and procedural problems as the main barriers. 
We discuss strategies to overcome these barriers, for example tighter 
certification procedures or more participatory arrangements. Our work 
contributes to the legitimacy, product labelling and food safety 
literatures as well as bourgeoning discussions on how to facilitate more 
sustainable consumption and production in China. 
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Institutionalising the organic labelling scheme in 
China: a legitimacy perspective  
Abstract  
Transitioning towards organic consumption and production has been widely promoted as a 
more sustainable alternative for urban and rural food systems. Our paper shows how a focus on 
legitimacy can shed light on current barriers to deeper institutionalisation of the organic 
labelling scheme in China. Based upon documentary analysis, personal observations and over 70 
qualitative interviews we identify consequential concerns amongst Chinaǯs small scale farmers, 
limited support by the Chinese central government, and procedural problems as the main 
barriers. We discuss strategies to overcome these barriers, for example tighter certification 
procedures or more participatory arrangements. Our work contributes to the legitimacy, 
product labelling and food safety literatures as well as bourgeoning discussions on how to 
facilitate more sustainable consumption and production in China.  
 Keywords: Organic Food; China; Product Labelling; Legitimacy; New Institutional Theory 
1. Introduction  
Transitioning towards more sustainable agricultural production and consumption in China 
is increasingly viewed as a crucial piece in the global sustainability puzzle. An alignment with 
organic labelling standards, in other words, a shift toward organic consumption and production 
is a widely promoted path to achieve these goals (Vittersø and Tangeland 2015; Reisch et al. 
2013; Thøgersen et al. this volume; Yi et al. 2001; Qiao et al. this volume). The stated aim of the 
International Federation for Organic Agricultural Movement (IFOAM) and the Research Institute 
of Organic Agriculture (FIBL) is for organic consumption and production to become the 
mainstream approach to sustainability worldwide (Willer and Lernoud 2015). Some argue 
(Klintman and Bostroem 2012) that organic trends are already far from being insignificant with 
obvious potential for overall food transitions. Revenues from sales of organic produce have 
*Manuscript
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 2 
increased almost five fold since 1999 with more and more land certified to organic standards in 
almost all regions of the world (Willer and Lernoud 2015).  
China, home to the worldǯs largest food and beverage retail market (Garnett and Wilkes 
2014), has been no exception to this trend. A total organic acreage of 3.529 million hectares 
(1.287million hectares certified to Chinese organic standards, 0.807million hectares to foreign 
organic standards; 1.435 million hectares to wild collection) produced in 2013 a total of 10.808 
million tons of organic cereals (588,000 hectares), soybeans and other oilseeds (235,000 
hectares), fruits and nuts (221,000 hectares), green fodder (129,000 hectares), tea (53,000 
hectares), vegetables (51,000 hectares), and other plants (22.000 hectares) (Meng et al. 2015), 
making it the fastest growing sector of Chinese agriculture (Ken Research 2013) and China the 
fourth largest producer of organic food (Willer and Lernoud 2015). 
Early on, the main aim of aligning Chinese agricultural production with international 
organic labelling standards was to supply Western markets (International Trade Centre (ITC) 
2011; Ken Research 2013; Yin et al. 2010). Recent years have seen an increased focus on a 
rapidly rising Chinese consumer society with organic food officials introducing a national 
Chinese organic labelling scheme1 ǲto develop retail sales among China's growing urban middle 
class" (Thiers 2002: 368). The strategy has been partly successful: the domestic market for 
products certified and labelled through the Chinese organic labelling scheme has grown 
significantly since the mid-2000s, particularly in first tier cities (ITC 2011; Xie et al. 2011; 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 2005; Yin et al. 2010; Meng et al. 2015). 
China is now the third largest organic market in the world in terms of sales (Willer and Lernoud 
2015).  
                                                             
 
1 We here define product labeling schemes as comprising three main building blocks coordinated by one or multiple 
organisational bodies: a standard that provides rules, guidelines or characteristics for product related processes and 
production methods; an assessment to what extent the specifications of the standard are met; and an aggregation of 
the assessment results into higher level information communicated on or with the product (Dendler 2013). 
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 3 
Yet despite its strong growth, the organic sector in China is still in its ǲearly infancyǳ 
(Thøgersen and Zhou 2012: 316) contributing less than 1% of China's agricultural production 
(Meng et al. 2015) and only 0.29-0.44% of total food consumption (Qiao 2014). By shedding 
light on current barriers to deeper institutionalisation of the Chinese organic labelling scheme, 
this paper aims to improve our understanding of how China could contribute more to a global 
transition towards sustainable consumption and production.  
To study these barriers, we focus on the notion of legitimacy as many authors consider 
legitimacy to be of key importance for organisations (e.g. Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and 
Powell 2008; Dowling and Pfeffer 1975), governance schemes (e.g. Biermann et al. 2010; Borras 
& Conzelmann 2007; Knorringa et al. 2011) and sustainability related product labelling schemes 
(e.g. Cashore 2002; Black 2008; Dendler 2013). So far, research on the Chinese organic labelling 
scheme has mainly focused on consumer knowledge, understanding and/or willingness to pay 
as well as barriers at the primary production level. Studies of how the construction of legitimacy 
may facilitate or hinder alignment with its standards are missing. By addressing this gap, our 
work contributes not only to bourgeoning discussions on how to facilitate more sustainable 
consumption and production in China but also the wider product labelling, food safety and 
legitimacy literatures. 
In the following we expand on how previous authors have positioned legitimacy as a 
crucial variable for the success of social entities. We will then apply these concepts to the 
Chinese organic labelling scheme showing how legitimacy has been constructed around four 
main principles: procedures, consequences, disposition and regulation. Our analysis is based on 
a triangulated approach including documentary review, personal observations and interviews 
with over 70 stakeholders. We explain our method in section three. We illustrate the usefulness 
of the concepts by discussing how the construction of legitimacy has shaped alignment with the 
Chinese organic labelling scheme across different actor groups. We then discuss strategies to 
facilitate a deeper institutionalisation of the Chinese organic labelling scheme. The last section 
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 4 
concludes with reflections on our main findings, their implications for the legitimacy literature 
and further research.   
2. Literature Review 
There is a large interdisciplinary literature on the critical role of legitimacy for the 
development and success of social entities. Within political sciences, many relate legitimacy to 
notions of power and authority, framing it as the linchpin that lends justification to the use of 
power through formal or informal social consent (Beetham 1991). Within organisational studies, 
legitimacy is seen to determine the support of an organisation across its internal participants 
and external constituents (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 2008; Dowling and 
Pfeffer 1975). Legitimacy is also included in many models of institutional change and 
institutionalisation processes (DiMaggio 1988; Hargrave and van de Ven 2006; Greenwood et al. 
2002). Dendler (2013) emphasizes its importance for the institutionalisation of social entities that aim to provide a new ǲsocial orderǳ ȋWeber ͳͻʹͳȌ, with product labelling schemes being a 
prominent example of such entities in current societies. This resonates with many other authors 
who have stressed the importance of legitimacy for product labelling schemes (Cashore 2002; 
Black 2008) such as the Forest Stewardship Council (Cashore et al. 2006; Waddel and Khagram 
2007), the Marine Stewardship Council (Gulbrandsen 2010; Bostroem 2006), the European 
Union ecolabel (Jordan 2006), energy efficiency (Wiel and McMahon 2005) and organic labels 
(Hatanaka 2014). 
Definitions of legitimacy vary across these literatures. Following a new institutional 
approach, we define legitimacy as ǲa generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity [in this case the product labelling scheme] are desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" (Suchman 1995: 
574). These perceptions are assumed to be based on individual ǲjudgementsǳ ȋTost ʹͲͳͳ; 
Bitektine and Haack 2015) along self-interest (i.e ǲpragmaticǳ), normative (i.e. ǲmoralǳ) and 
taken for granted (i.e. ǲcognitiveǳ) dimensions (Suchman 1995). We assume they result in 
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 5 
behavioural consequences, manifest in non-discursive form, such as engagement in exchange 
relations or imposition of sanctions or in discursive form as expressions of judgements to other 
actors through social networks, the media, or other channels (Bitektine 2011; Bitektine and 
Haack 2015). As such, we hold that legitimacy plays a crucial role in deepening the 
institutionalisation of product labelling schemes and furthering alignment across systems of 
consumption and production (Dendler 2013).  
 New institutional writing emphasizes how (individual) legitimacy judgements are 
relationally shaped by majority opinion, in particular by ǲjudgement validation institutionsǳ ȋBitektine and (aack, ʹͲͳͷȌ and other ǲkey legitimacy actorsǳ ȋDendler ʹͲͳ͵Ȍ with ǲsuperiorǳ 
(Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006) or ǲsubject positionsǳ ȋMaguire and Hardy 2009) in the field. For 
example, positive (individual) legitimacy judgements expressed in newspaper articles can 
significantly influence other actorǯs legitimacy judgements and provide crucial information 
about generalized or ǲcollective-levelǳ ȋBitektine and (aack, ʹͲͳͷȌ legitimacy perceptions. Also, 
judgements by powerful actors and their respective behavioural consequences can have 
significant effects on wider (collective level) legitimacy perceptions. Such Ǯrelational pushesǯ 
(Dendler and Randles) can include, for example, a powerful corporation expressing its positive 
legitimacy judgement by aligning its supply chain management with a particular label or a well-
positioned NGO promoting a label in its corporate and consumer communication. From these 
relational arguments it also follows that organisations can strategically influence the 
construction of legitimacy for their own organisation (Suchman 1995) and/or a new order they 
aim to institutionalise (Dendler 2013) through different legitimation strategies.  
So far, our picture has been a rather dynamic one painting legitimacy as a social construction 
between various actors in the field. However, previous studies in the Western context also found 
stability. Dendler (2013, 2014), for example, identified a clustering of legitimacy constructions 
around several ǲkey principlesǳ ȋLeca and Naccache ʹͲͲ͸), including:  
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 6 
 Consequences: association with positive or negative consequences in relation to 
individual self-interests or greater societal welfare (Suchman 1995);  
 Procedures: belief in the validity of the procedures followed (Suchman 1995), often 
related to norms of inclusiveness and deliberation;  
 Disposition: belief in the (charismatic) exemplariness of an organisation that is 
perceived to have "our best interests at heart" (Suchman 1995: 578) and/or holds 
(traditional) public confidence (Suchman 1995; Weber 1922) (the former is often 
associated with NGOs, the latter can be attributed, for example, to governmental 
organisations).  
 Regulation: usually evolving from conformity with laws (Tost 2011; Weber 1922; Barker 
1990).  
With these theoretical arguments in mind, the aim of our research was to investigate the 
social construction of legitimacy and its impact on institutionalisation in the context of the 
Chinese organic labelling scheme. To that end we identified legitimation strategies of the organic 
labelling organisation(s) and generalized legitimacy perceptions and their behavioural 
consequences in the field. The latter we inferred from judgments aggregated and communicated by ǲmacrolevel judgment validation institutionsǳ (Bitektine and Haack 2015) and from 
observable behaviour and discourse of other actors, especially ǲkey legitimacy actorsǳ (Dendler 
2013). We used a combination of research methods to meet this aim, which are described in 
section 3.  
3. Empirics 
Firstly, our study drew upon a review of academic and other relevant documents, such as 
policy reports and plans, administrative documents and organisational reports. All were 
identified through keyword searches of academic and non-academic databases as well as a 
review of relevant websites on the Chinese organic labelling scheme. Based upon our review of 
the legitimacy literature we developed a coding tree consisting of three main branches: 
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 7 
legitimation strategies applied by labelling organisations; other relational influences through 
key actors; wider legitimacy perceptions.  We used this coding tree to thematically analyse 
(Bowen 2009) our material within the software Citavi. Grounded in critical realist thinking 
(Danermark et al. 2002), we flexibly adjusted our codes as our causal enquiry proceeded.  
Secondly, we used primary data from site visits (retail outlets, farmers markets, primary 
production and manufacturing facilities), personal observations and over 70 in-depth interviews 
as well as informal conversations conducted between March 2013 and May 2014 (see Appendix 
1 for an anonymised list of all interviews). The aim of the interviews was partly to gain insights 
into individual level legitimacy judgement processes. Mainly however, we aimed to identify 
generalized or ǲcollective levelǳ (Bitektine and Haack 2015) legitimacy perceptions by 
interviewing key actors. Key actors were identified during the first phase of the research. By 
visiting relevant trade fairs (2013 and 2014 Shanghai Biofach; 14th China (Beijing) International 
Organic Food and Green Food Expo; 15th China (Shanghai) International Organic Food Industry 
Expo) and by following a snow balling approach we arranged further interviews. Ultimately our 
study involved interviews with actors from across the Chinese food consumption and 
production system, including those from primary production, processing, trading, retailing 
(organic and mainstream) as well as non-governmental, governmental, labelling and 
certification organisations. Interviews were conducted in both English and Mandarin, the latter 
with the assistance of a translator. Interview recordings and notes were analysed within the 
software Nvivo drawing upon and further adjusting the coding tree developed during the first 
phase of the study.  
In the next section we discuss the main organisational bodies involved in organic 
legitimation strategies at different levels, more precisely in standard setting, certification and 
communication. In section 5 we present our findings about how legitimacy has been constructed 
by these labelling organisations, and how it has been perceived and constructed further by other 
actors in the field. In section 6 we consider how these legitimacy constructions have affected the 
Chinese organic labelling scheme and discuss strategies to facilitate deeper institutionalisation.   
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4. The Chinese organic labelling scheme  
Similar to other countries in Europe or the United States of America (Steering Committee 
of the State-of-Knowledge Assessment of Standards and Certification 2012; Stolze and Lampkin 
2009), the Chinese organic organisational structure is dominated by the state with respect to 
standard setting and organisational structure. In 1995, the National Environmental Protection Bureau of China issued the ǲOrganic ȋNatureȌ food producing and processing 
technical specificationǳ and ǲOrganic ȋNatureȌ food logo management regulationǳ, which formed 
the basis for organic labelling in China (Xi 2010). Nine years later, eleven ministries from the 
central government published the first national policy on organic agricultural promotion (ITC ʹͲͳͳȌ. This was followed in ʹͲͲͷ by the ǮAdministrative Measures on Organic Product Certificationǯ, issued by the Standardization Administration of China and the General 
Administration on Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine. A major revision of this 
standard took place in 2014.  
The Chinese organic standards partly mimic the principles and requirements of IFOAM 
Basic Standards for Organic Production and Processing as well as international regulations but 
with added emphasis on contamination by pollutants and prohibited materials and quality 
management systems (Marchesini 2009; ITC 2011; Sheng et al. 2009; Xiao and Xiaorong 2003).  
Since 1994, the Organic Food Development Centre (OFDC) in Nanjing, which is part of 
the Ministry for Environment, has been the leading official organisation in charge of inspection, 
certification and management of organic production in China. Their remit extends to 
management and supervision of the official organic product logo (Sanders 2006a; Yi et al. 2001 
Biao and Xiaorong 2003). According to documents (OFDC-MEP n.d.) and interviews, the OFDC 
has engaged in planning and research on policies, standard production and technology, as well 
as publicity, technical support, training and quality control of organic farming. The OFDC are 
also actively involved in the drafting, revision and evaluation of the organic standards (OFDC-
MEP n.d.). In 1999, an additional Organic Food Research and Consulting Centre (OFRC) was 
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 9 
established to further promote "the growth of the organic food industry." The OFRC advises 
farmers, processors and traders and helps source certified organic fertilizers, pest control 
materials and physical control materials (OFRC 2006-2014).  
Currently the Global Organic Trade Guide 
(http://www.globalorganictrade.com/countries.php?idx=11) lists 26 national and 6 
international certification companies including a certification body within OFDC. As with all 
certification schemes in China, OFDC needs to be approved by the Certification and Accreditation Administration of the Peopleǯs Republic of China ȋCNCAȌ and accredited by the China National 
Accreditation Service for Conformity Assessment (OFDC n.d.; ITC 2011). According to their 
promotional material, OFDC is one of the main professional training facilities for national 
organic product certification inspectors. OFDC cooperates closely with international 
organisations such as FIBL, Soil Association, United Nations Environment Programme and the 
World Bank (OFDC- MEP n.d.) and its certification operation is accredited by the International 
Organic Accreditation Service under the IFOAM accreditation programme (ITC 2011; Siriex 
2011Sanders 2006b).  
In summary, one can identify OFDC, OFRC and CNCA as the main organisational bodies 
involved in legitimation strategies at different levels of the consumption and production system. 
Certification organisations are also very active in wider legitimacy construction. This includes 
the building of links between companies; trainings; information services and involvement in the 
development of organic product standards and policies (see e.g. China Organic Food Certification 
Centre (COFCC) n.d.). We will now outline how legitimacy has been constructed between these 
organisations and other actors in the food consumption and production system.  
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 10 
5. Constructing legitimacy in the context of the Chinese organic 
labelling scheme  
We systematically analysed the secondary and primary data according to the theories 
described above, using legitimacy principles, namely consequences, procedures, disposition and 
regulation, as the main structure. Where appropriate we further unpacked legitimacy 
construction across actor groups.  
5.1 Consequential legitimacy 
The organic labelling scheme has been promoted as providing multiple positive societal 
consequences: ǲensuring human health and protecting [the] ecological environmentǳ and 
contributing to a ǲhealthy sustainable development of the society" in China (OFDC-MEP n.d.). 
Most dominantly, this has been linked to food safety and potential health benefits on the side of 
the consumer. This resonates with previous findings on the organic scheme in China (Thiers 
2002; Liu et al. 2013; Xie et al. 2015; Klein 2011) and in other countries (Stolze and Lampkin 
2009; Klintman and Bostroem 2012; Steering Committee 2012; Thogersen et al. 2015a).  
Across actor groups, analysis of the interview and documentary evidence reveals that 
both promotion and support based on environmental benefits (e.g. reduction of water and soil 
pollution, protection of biodiversity), animal welfare, and equality goals (e.g. rural development 
and greater protection of and welfare for farmers and their spouses) have limited impact. For 
example, one interviewee asserted: ǲConsumers are worried about food safety. The companies 
cultivated demand for organic based on that mind set. […] the organic industry is kind of twisted: 
organic is actually about harmony between people and nature and not about food safety.ǳ 
(Interview 24, translated). The following sub-sections will discuss in more detail how different 
consequential self-interests shaped judgements across actors groups, including primary 
producers (farmers), manufacturers, retailers and consumers.  
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5.1.1 Primary producers 
Economic and market related benefits are commonly mentioned in interviews and 
documents (Oelofse et al. 2010, 2011; IFAD 2005; Zhang et al. 2015) as positive consequences of 
an alignment of primary production with organic standards. These benefits include creating 
recognition with and meeting demands of consumers, higher market prices, differentiation from 
competitors and better market access through improved positioning with retailers and 
manufacturers. However, not all interviewees recognised these benefits with several 
commenting on insufficient demand and limited opportunities for price premiums. Farmers 
often refer to additional labour and knowledge requirements as well as higher financial and time 
costs (see also IFAD 2005; Oelofse et al. 2010; Qiao 2010; Cadilhon 2009; Xi 2010; Kuehl and 
Yonggong 2014; Xio and Xiaorong 2003; Liu et al. 2010; Zhang et al. 2015; Sanders 2006a; 
Sanders 2006b). Interviewees repeatedly communicated problems of getting access to modern 
organic technology, including organic pesticides and fertilizers, but also access to suitable land. 
One interviewee commented how the ǲprice of land is increasing but even if you have enough 
money you can still not get enough land….because they have to find agreement with all the farmers 
as in China the land belongs to everybodyǳ ȋinterview ͵͹, translatedȌ.  
In addition, farmers spoke of long conversion periods during which they were likely to 
see yield decreases (see also Xiao and Xiaorong 2003; Zhang et al. 2015; Sanders 2006b). One 
interviewee for example described: ǲCrop yield is lower especially for small and new companies as 
the organic fertilizer is effective only very slowly. If the fertility [of the soil] is not high, the yield will 
go down. And the crop disease will be higherǳ (interview 37, translated).  
Whilst IFAD (2005) advocates a stronger consequential orientation towards wider 
benefits, such as drought resistance and erosion reduction, improved local nutrition security or 
protection of biodiversity and clean water sources, we found that such benefits were mentioned 
less frequently as consequential motivations (Oelofse et al. 2010; Cadilhon 2009; Yin et al. 2010; 
Liu et al. 2013). Instead, pragmatic support mechanisms, in particular from local government 
organisations, appear to be more effective. These include technical and financial (e.g. lower tax 
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rates, direct payments, investment and loan privileges, subsidized rental rates and land 
donations, subsidized bio-pesticides, seeds or organic fertilizers and initial financing for 
certification), organisational, marketing and market access support (see also IFAD 2005; 
Sanders 2006a; Taylor 2008; Thiers 2002, 2005; Qiao 2010). 
5.1.2 Manufacturers and retailers 
During interviews, primary producers often mentioned demand from manufacturers 
and/or retailers as incentives for the support of the organic scheme. Manufacturers pointed to 
consumer demand and brand image as potential consequential benefits but mainly talked about 
the associated costs for human resources, certification, materials and processing technology. As 
organic certification usually needs to be obtained for every ingredient, negative consequences 
can emerge from having to manage, control and certify often highly fragmented supply chains.  
For retailers, consumer demand and potential price premiums are prominent gains, both 
in documentary (e.g. Ken Research 2013) and interview data. Similar to Western markets 
(Dendler 2013) consumer surveys are influential. One interviewee from the retail realm 
(interview 66) describes for example how retail managers are driven by a desire to meet 
consumer demand in reaction to consumer surveys that communicate higher willingness to pay 
for organic certified products. Increased food safety concerns, provoked by media coverage of 
various food safety scandals as well as activities by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
have created interest from retailers in providing traceable products (see also Scott and Suarez 
2012). For example, Greenpeace exposed major supermarket chains selling products with illegal 
pesticides and made the connection with negative impacts on human health (Greenpeace 2006a, 
2006b). Over the next few years Greenpeace continued to put pressure on retailers to ensure 
their supply chains were transparent and to minimise pesticide residues (Greenpeace 2011a, 
2011b, 2012). While NGOs generally play a comparatively small role in the Chinese organic 
labelling scheme (see further discussion in section 5.2.3), such activities have captured much 
attention, especially within Chinese social media. As such, it resonates strongly with NGO driven ǲindividualised collective actionǳ (Clarke et al. 2007) and ǲnaming and shamingǳ (Steering 
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Committee 2012) dynamics prominent in Western labelling contexts (Steering Committee 2012; 
Gulbrandsen 2006).  
5.1.3 Consumers 
Both documents (Yin et al. 2010; Lin, et al. 2010; Liu et al. 2013; Cadilhon 2009; Wang 
2014a; Xi 2010; Xie et al. 2015; Yip and Janssen 2015; Siriex et al. 2011) and interviews 
frequently blame high prices for negatively affecting consequential perceptions on the consumer 
side. Higher production costs, as well as premiums added along the supply chain, means the 
price of most organic products is at least two to five times higher than that of conventional 
products (Meng et al. 2015; Thogersen et al. 2015a). To overcome this barrier, many previous 
studies (e.g. IFAD 2005; ITC 2011; Yin et al. 2010; Cadilhon 2009; Taylor 2008; Liu et al. 2013; 
Veeck and Burns 2005; Wang 2014a; Willer and Lernoud 2015: Xie et al. 2015; Chen et al. 2013; 
Yip and Janssen 2015; Siriex et al. 2011) and nearly all interviewees pointed to the relevance of 
perceived food safety and health benefits, especially for children. Food safety has become one of 
the most prominently discussed societal issues in China, including controversies around 
excessive pesticide and other chemical use and, to a lesser degree, potential negative health 
impacts associated with genetically modified organisms (Liu et al. 2013; Zhang et al. 2012; Wang 
et al. 2008; Wu et al. 2011; Whitehead 2015; Xu et al. 2012; Yin et al. 2010; Yang 2011; ITC 2011; 
Klein 2011). The purchase of organic certified products has been communicated as directly addressing such concerns by providing a healthier and safe alternative that is more ǲfreshǳ 
(interviews ͳͶ/ʹ͵Ȍ, ǲtastyǳ ȋinterviews ͷ/ʹͲ/͸ͶȌ, ǲnutritiousǳ ȋinterviews 19/20) and free of 
genetically modified substances, pesticides, fertilizers and carcinogens (see also Cadilhon 2009). 
OFRCC, for example, promotes the "virtues of organic food: healthy, security and tasty" (Xi 
2010). Another interviewee from a certification company described how they organize events 
for new born babies, young children and the elderly in health centres and hospitals during which 
nutritionists emphasize the health benefits associated with the consumption of organic certified 
products (Interview 8). Our own observations supported such descriptions. Resonating with 
Klein (2011) we found connections to traditional food therapies that draw upon a close 
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relationship between human health, nature and rural livelihoods. Recent restructuring 
strategies target this issue more explicitly by shifting the organic standard from non-use of 
prohibited materials to one of non-contamination and residue free production assurance 
(Lernoud et al. 2013). We discuss these and other procedural changes in the next section.  
5.2 Procedural legitimacy 
Many interviewees referred to the organic scheme as helping to create ǲrecognitionǳ (e.g. 
interview 53) and ǲtrustǳ (e.g. interview 26). However, both the previous literature (Ken 
Research 2013; Liu et al. 2013; Scott et al. 2014; Taylor 2008; Veeck et al. 2010; Xie et al. 2015; 
Chen and Lobo 2012) and our interviews also point to significant procedural criticism. Some 
interviewees related this to a ǲgeneral trust crisisǳ ȋinterviews 23) and a ǲlack of credibility for 
certificationǳ ȋinterview ͸ͺȌ created by ǲshadows leftǳ ȋinterviews 41) from previous food 
scandals; others made explicit links to procedural shortcomings of the organic labelling scheme 
itself.  
Calls for multi stakeholder participation, inclusiveness and transparency, considered 
highly important in Western contexts (see e.g. Gulbrandsen 2010; Boström and Klintman 2008; 
Meidinger 2008), were not prominent in our research. While the CNCA has enabled participation 
in standard setting by posting standards online for public feedback or inviting academics, 
certification companies and other organisations to comment, interviewees emphasized limited 
engagement. One interviewee explained: ǲI think the Chinese public does not have the awareness to 
be involved and give comments…. I know when USDA [United States Department of Agriculture] 
issued the draft they had more than 10000 comments from producers and all stakeholders. But for our 
standard, not so much: less than 1000 maybe [and] the main comments came from the certifier” 
(interview 4).  
At the same time we find concern about dominant state actors and potential conflicts of 
interests with the certification process (Thiers 2002; Kuehl and Yonggong 2014; Organic Trade 
Association; Wei 2012). In 2011 Chinese national television reported how certification "could 
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easily be bought" as some certification departments, producers and retailers were ǲwilling to 
stick organic food labels onto non-organic food in order to make more money. […] Organic food 
such as vegetables from producers that claim not to use chemical fertilizers or pesticides cannot 
be entirely trusted" (Zhang 2011). Wal-Mart, amongst others, was accused of fraudulently 
selling organic products (Wang 2011); an online newspaper reported that "organic certification 
officials regularly accept 'gifts' from food companies in China" (Wei 2012). Similar criticism 
featured frequently in our interviews describing how certification companies are in fierce 
competition with each other and would interpret the organic standards with different degrees of 
stringency. Others reported how some companies would sell all their products as organic even 
though only some of them received certification.  
Such prominent procedural criticism has had serious effects not only on consumer but 
also corporate legitimacy judgements (Ken Research 2013; Yin et al. 2010; Liu et al. 2013; Scott 
et al. 2014; Taylor 2008; Veeck et al. 2010; Xie et al. 2015). One interviewee from a main retail 
chain for example argued: ǲ…it is difficult for retailers to be 100 percent sure that the products are 
organic …..the consumer will have a question mark when they go to [retailers] as there has been a 
lot of negative news in the past. Products were labelled organic but were actually notǳ (interview 
68).  
CNCA officials have publicly acknowledged exaggeration and false promotion, non-
standardised use of the label and insufficient control of the circulation of the label. In response, 
CNCA engaged in multiple procedural repair strategies. Interviewees reported how immediately 
following the national TV coverage, CNCA asked all certification organisations to recheck their 
documentation, resulting in the withdrawal of many certificates. Shortly after, the National 
Standards for Organic Products were revised, according to Scott et al. (2014: 161) to better ǲprotect against fraudǳ. Major changes included not only zero-tolerance for residues but also the 
introduction of authentication codes for each product to enable consumers to trace their origin 
(the barcode scheme); prohibition of parallel planting in one-year crops; certified inspection of 
each crop variety; and inspection of all farms in cooperative groups (Hallmann and Xu 2012). 
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CNCA announced that they would also increase the control over certification organisations; 
increase risk management; and strengthen risk assessment of employees through the 
certification companies. Associated with these changes, a number of interviewees commented 
on stricter standards, increased monitoring and better traceability; how it was ǲeasy to bribe 
certifiers in the past but not anymore. […] They come and test every piece of landǳ (interview 41). 
But despite procedural progress, both interviews and documents suggest that procedural 
problems are not fully solved. During the 2014 Shanghai Biofach Fair, the director of CNCA 
reported ad hoc checks were still finding around 15% of products using the term organic even 
though they are incorrectly or not at all certified, around 2% exceeding pesticide levels and 3% 
not being fully in line with other organic regulation (Wang 2014a).  
5.3 Dispositional and regulatory legitimacy 
Our research found some NGOs, such as the World Wildlife Fund, and other civil societal 
organisations (Klein 2009; Nanjing Global Organic Food Research and Consulting Center 2006-
2014; OFDC-MEP n.d.; Monica Tan 2012) actively promoting the organic scheme. In line with 
dominant consequential concerns, this promotion is linked mainly to health and food safety 
through events in health clubs or schools (see also Klein 2011). To some extent this contributes to what may be referred to as Ǯdispositional legitimacyǯ in the form of a belief in organisations 
that are perceived to operate in our best interests. But overall, NGOs play a comparatively small 
role in the Chinese organic scheme, a finding that resonates with previous studies (Oberheitman 
2009; Sun and Zhao 2007; Geall and Hilton 2014).  
Instead, the role of the state occupies the foreground. Next to the pragmatic support 
described above, interviewees described how governmental involvement in the organic labelling 
organisation contributes to the creation of trust: ǲwithout government nothing can happenǳ 
(interview 10), ǲgovernment has to stand behindǳ ȋinterview ͳ͵Ȍ as it is ǲimportantǳ ȋinterview ͶͲȌ and ǲmost powerfulǳ ȋinterview ʹͳȌ. Such statements resonate with consumer surveys in the 
food context (Ortega et al. 2011; Liu et al. 2013) and other academic studies on China (e.g. Wang 
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2005 or Zhang et al. this volume) who refer to high levels of trust in the central government in a 
more abstract sense (as opposed to activities carried out at the local level). It seems that 
governmental involvement in product labelling facilitates cognitive acceptance based on what 
Weber referred to as ǲimmemorial traditions that have always prevailed and the legitimacy of 
those exercising authority under themǳ ȋWeber ͳͻʹʹ: part ͳ, ))), ͳ, ʹȌ. Further supporting such 
arguments, we find a number of authoritative governmental interventions. These include the 
conversion of land for the establishment of ecological agriculture zones or the initiation of 
individual farm conversions (Scott et al. 2014; OFDC-MEP n.d.; IFAD 2005; ITC 2011; Thiers 
2002, 2005; Qiao 2010; Xi 2010; Sanders 2006b). Thiers (2002: 396) speaks of "administrative 
methods to convince the peasants'' to engage in organic farming, which implies that "if a peasant 
family refuses to participate, they are moved off the land and exchanged with a family from 
another field who are willing to cooperate". IFAD (2005) notes that with increasing trends 
towards market orientation local governments are moving away from direct ownership and 
have transferred rights to private firms. However, this process has allegedly left some of the 
former public companies in the private hands of local government leaders, which often enjoy 
unique advantages and support for their contracted farmers. In many communities former state 
owned farms and collectives continue to exist and often direct rural industry and sideline 
production (Selden and Perry 2010; Sanders 2006a). More recent management literature re-
emphasises how especially in sectors based on key resources, such as land, China maintains 
strong ties between government and business (Walder 2011, Shi et al. 2014). Our interviews 
supported such propositions, reporting governmental initiation of organic conversion, 
encouragement to engage in organic promotion and the relevance of organic alignment in 
governmental evaluation of local companies.  
The Chinese central government is also involved in what can be referred to as regulatory 
legitimation as all products using the term ǲorganicǳ or other characters, graphics or symbols 
suggesting organic production need to comply legally with the national organic regulation 
(National Standard of the Peopleǯs Republic of China). While this regulation used to be mainly 
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enforced with respect to the Chinese language, law enforcement has recently started to extend 
its scope to the use of the term in other languages (Hallmann and Xu 2012).  
6. Discussion 
In the following we discuss how legitimacy constructions outlined in the previous 
sections have affected support for the Chinese organic labelling scheme within the current 
production and consumption system. We then reflect on strategies organic labelling 
organisations may apply to achieve more positive judgements and facilitate deeper 
institutionalisation.  
6.1 Primary producers 
As a result of the rural reforms of the early 1980s (Sanders 2006; Selden 2010; Zhang et 
al. 2013), farming in China is conducted by millions of small farmers with an average farm size of 
0.6 hectares often living on an income of less than $2 per day (Carter et al. 2002; Garnett and 
Wilkes 2014). While some argue that ǲfarmersǯ poverty has been one of the primary factors in 
predisposing them to take the risks involved in converting to organic methodsǳ ȋSanders ʹͲͲ͸a: 
127), our research finds significant consequential barriers. These relate partly to capacity 
problems in terms of finance, quality control, harvesting or post-harvest techniques. Few 
farmers in China have the ability to operate and negotiate within a complex value chain (IFAD 
2005; Hu et al. 2008; Jia et al. 2012). Price premiums, usually gained in urban areas and/or by 
other market actors, or long term contracts with buyers are not easily available (Yang 
2011/2012; Thiers 2005). Increasing pollution levels and competing demands from the 
construction and other sectors amplify longstanding land access challenges while current 
ownership structures reduce incentives for investment into the land (Wang 2014b; Li 
Chenggang 2013).  
Capacity problems for smallholders are not an issue limited to China. It is a widely 
recognized problem within the organic movement (Willer and Lernoud 2015; Klintman and 
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Bostroem, 2012) and with many other sustainability labelling schemes (Matus Forthcoming; 
Dendler 2013; Steering Committee 2012). However, the very high number of small scale farms in 
China makes this a more acute challenge.  
6.2 Governmental actors 
IFAD (2005: 5) conclude that the most important factor for successful organic adoption 
in China is the availability of a reliable support system, an assertion supported by interviewees 
for this study. Echoing other studies in the Chinese food context (e.g. Zhang et al., this volume; 
Mol 2014), our research finds a particularly strong role for governmental actors, not only in 
pragmatic and more abstract trust building terms, but also in more authoritative terms where 
they can draw upon their traditional position in the Chinese agricultural system. In this sense 
our findings resonate with previous authors who refer to China as ǲfragmented 
authoritarianismǳ ȋGeall and Hilton 2014) or a ǲfragmented entrepreneurial stateǳ ȋThiers ʹͲͲʹ: 
358) where state actors use political authority through ǲan unassailable civil service" (Fan et al. 
2011: 18) as well as competitors in the socialist market economy (Thiers 2002). 
However, it is interesting to note the limited extent to which government has exercised 
these types of power. While developing organic agricultural products has appeared repeatedly in Chinaǯs central policy documents (Liu et al. 2013), been promoted by some of its senior party 
leaders (Sanders 2006a) and incorporated into local government promotion schemes to 
facilitate green development and ǲeco-civilizationǳ ȋMeng et al. 2015; Wang 2014a; Qiao 2010; Xi 
2010), our research suggests more scope for governmental influence. Many interviews, 
documents (e.g. IFAD 2005) and academic studies (e.g. Zhang et al. 2013) argue that central 
government support has been comparatively low, lacking ǲsubstantial funding" ȋQiao ʹͲͳͲȌ and 
falling behind the support of other product labelling schemes such as the Green Food Label2. 
                                                             
 
2 Next to the organic labelling scheme, the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture hosts a so called Hazard Free and a Green 
Food labelling schemes. While the emphasis of Hazard Free food is on the residue content, Green Food is based on 
concepts of environmental protection and sustainable development. Unlike the organic scheme both allow for 
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Indeed, the vast majority of resources still promote conventional agriculture (IFAD 2005). Some 
observers point to competing ministerial priorities (Taylor 2008), especially in regard to food 
security. Given lower productivity rates and greater demands by organic agricultural practices 
on highly scarce land resources, it is widely considered that organic production cannot provide for Chinaǯs growing population (Xie 2008; Chen & Wan, 2005; Xiao this issue; Scott et al. 2014; 
Zhang et al. 2013). As one interviewee from a governmental organisation involved in the organic 
labelling scheme points out: ǲChina is a very big country with a big population so the highest 
priority is to produce enough food for the population, and then it is [about] producing safe food and 
then it is [about] the environment. That is why the aims for organic are limitedǳ (interview 7).  
6.3 Manufacturers and retailers  
In light of limited governmental support, market actors seem to have become more 
relevant for the institutionalisation of the Chinese organic labelling scheme. In the Western 
context, major retailers and branded manufacturers have exercised significant influence on the 
institutionalisation of organic and other sustainability related product labelling schemes 
(Dendler 2013; Steering Committee 2012; Bostroem and Klintmann 2008; Gulbrandsen 2006; 
Klintman and Bostroem 2012). Several interviewees saw large agricultural companies also as 
major drivers of the Chinese organic scheme. Generally however, organic food processing is 
presently in a nascent stage with retailers complaining about insufficient availability of organic 
(processed) products and the majority of organic farm products being sold as raw products 
(IFAD 2005; Ken Research 2013; Meng, Fangqiao et al. 2015). Our research suggests the main 
barriers for wider manufacturing support are: restricted scope of organic standards (i.e. criteria 
only covering some processing); difficulties in certifying multi staged, often highly fragmented 
Chinese food supply chains; procedural contestations and limited Ǯrelational pushǯ.  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
 
controlled and limited use of synthesized fertilizer, pesticide, growth regulators, feed additives and gene technology 
(Liu et al. ʹͲͳ͵Ȍ. They are hence sometimes considered as ǲhalf-way houseǳ between conventional and organic food 
(Paull 2008).  
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Similar barriers hinder retailers. While some documents suggest that conventional 
supermarkets have become the main channel for selling organic produce (ITC 2011; Xie et al. 
2011; Taylor 2008; Meng et al. 2015; Yip and Janssen 2015; Siriex et al. 2011), we found 
negative perceptions and very reserved support for (and further relational influence on) the 
organic labelling scheme among mainstream retailers. 
6.4 Consumers  
The limited relational push from manufacturer and retailer side can partly be explained 
with dominant perceptions of consumer demand. While consumer studies identify some demand 
and willingness to pay for organic certified products amongst Chinese consumers (ITC 2011; Liu 
et al. 2013; Xie et al. 2011; Yin et al. 2010; Zhang et al. this volume; Yip and Janssen 2015), this 
demand is generally considered to be limited to high income consumers in major cities (Lin et al. 
2010; Thøgersen and Zhou 2012; Yin et al. 2010; Xie at al. 2015; Thøgersen et al. 2015a; Siriex et 
al. 2011). Multiple sources of interview, academic and documentary evidence report collective 
consumer knowledge and awareness of the organic label to be low, with considerable confusion 
between different schemes (Yin et al. 2010; Zhang et al. 2012; Liu et al. 2013; Xi 2010; Zhang et 
al., this volume; Xie et al. 2015; Wu et al. 2014; Chen and Lobo 2012; Yi et al. 2001). With current 
media reporting on the organic scheme focusing mainly on procedural inconsistencies, we find 
rising mistrust among Chinese consumers and businesses alike. Linked to these procedural 
doubts, public criticism raises questions about the consequential benefits associated with the 
purchase of domestic organic certified products and facilitates a shift towards imported rather 
than Chinese organic certified food (Xie et al. 2011; Walley et al. 2014; ITC 2011; Yip and Janssen 
2015; Wu et al. 2014).  
6.5 Potential strategies to facilitate deeper institutionalisation  
In the light of such developments, improving perceptions of procedural legitimacy has 
become one of the main challenges for the deeper institutionalisation of the Chinese organic 
labelling scheme. This resonates with global organic trends, where there are increasing 
problems with fraud (Gould 2015), and wider discussions about inconsistencies in standard 
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interpretations (e.g. Steering Committee 2012 on sustainability labelling in general; Jacquet et al. 
2010 on the Marine Stewardship Council or Allison et al. 2000 on ecolabelling schemes) as well 
as general conflicts of interest in paid certification processes (e.g. Matus forthcoming). For the 
Steering Committee of the State-of-Knowledge Assessment of Standards and Certification (2012: 
15) Ǯauditor competenceǯ is ǲone of the most significant challenges to the integrity and credibility of voluntary standards and certificationǳ.  
To overcome these challenges, some interviewees called for deeper institutionalisation 
of social norms like honesty and trustworthiness. Others demanded a reduction of the number of 
certification companies involved, more severe punishments or more regular checking processes 
(see also Chen and Lobo 2012). But with increased procedural demands usually comes greater 
costs for those in supply chains which, as outlined above, can hinder consequential motivations 
of especially small scale producers.3 Again we find overlaps with international certification and 
labelling discussions around appropriate levels of standards stringency (e.g. Boström and 
Klintman 2008 on general sustainability labelling dynamics; Erkine and Collins 1997 on the EU 
ecolabel; Steinruecken and Jaenichen 2007 on the Fairtrade scheme).   
Bottom-up initiatives are an alternative way forward that does not rely on certification. 
Although there is no formal support in the Chinese organic regulations for ǮParticipatory 
Guarantee Schemesǯ and participants are not allowed to use the term organic (Wai 2015), our 
research found evidence of many primary producers engaging directly with consumers through 
membership schemes, farm visits, farm shops and home deliveries. Many of these new initiatives 
echo descriptions by other authors (Zhang et el. this volume; Si et al. 2014; Scott et al. 2014; Qiao 
2014) of emerging ǲalternative food networksǳ ȋZhang et al., this volumeȌ, in particular 
                                                             
 
3
 For example, recent procedural adjustments are already said to facilitate a shift away from small scale farming (which tends 
to include a variety of crops and is hence associated with more bureaucratic steps) towards large scale mono cultures. 
Such trends further contribute to what some see as an increased “conventionalisation” (Oelefse et al. 2011) of the organic 
scheme as well as growing urban migration. 
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ǮCommunity Supported Agricultureǯ or ǮParticipatory Guarantee Systemsǯ (Kirchner 2015) 
schemes.  
Within such schemes certification plays a less important role. Interviewees reported how they wanted to ǲsell to consumers who have built trust in their brand without certificateǳ 
[interviewee 39, translated] and to have ǲproper relationshipsǳ with customers and ǲbuild a 
communityǳ (informal conversation 75). Similar findings are described by Scott et al. (2014). 
Some actors within the global organic movement argue that ǲthe world needs to escape the 
limited perception that organic equates with certificationǳ (Gould 2015: 138). David Gould 
(2015: 138) from IFOAM, for example, calls for ǲa new market assurance frameworkǳ that moves 
towards a focus on common interest and transparency with more participation. Rather than 
formal third-party certification, ǮCommunity Supported Agricultureǯ and ǮParticipatory 
Guarantee Schemesǯ are based on ǲactive participationǳ of closely linked groups of producers, technology consultants and consumers ǲbuilt on a foundation of trust, social networks, and 
knowledge exchangeǳ ȋNanjing Global Organic Food Research and Consulting Center ʹͲͲ͸-
2014). Resonating with previous findings in the Chinese food sector (e.g. Zhang et al. this 
volume; Zhang et al. 2008; Veeck et al. 2010), several of our interviewees supported the importance of trust building through ǲseeingǳ ȋe.g. interviews ͳͲ/͵͸/͵͹/͵ͻ/ͷͳ/ͷͺȌ, ǲtryingǳ ȋe.g. interview ͳͲȌ and ǲtastingǳ ȋe.g. interviews Ͷ͵/ͷ͵/ͷͺȌ and relational dynamics where ǲold 
customers will promote [their products] to new customersǳ (interview 43). As such, these schemes 
fit well with a Chinese traditional focus on personal experience (e.g. extensive individual 
checking prior to food purchase) and direct relational links (Berkenama et al. 2015; Redding and 
Witt 2006; Veeck et al. 2010; Hoiman and King 2008) in what some authors refer to as a ǲlow-
trust society" (Sheng et al. 2009). They also fit into central governmental rhetoric of a shift towards ǲsocial-co-regulationǳ (Xiao 2015) to ensure food safety or environmental protection 
(Horsley 2006; Geall and Hilton 2014).  
Indeed, Scott et al. (2014) propose that consumers and small producers increasingly ǲreject the stateǯs assurances and begin the complex civil process of reconnecting and re-
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negotiating trust through direct relationships between producers and eatersǳ ȋScott et al. 
2014:164). Zhang et al. (this volume) on the other hand report comparatively low uptake of ǮAlternative Food Networksǯ even among wealthier and higher educated Chinese consumers and 
suggest a continuous high trust in central government. Our research supports especially Zhang 
et al.ǯs (this volume) latter point and additionally highlights less prominence of norms of 
participation and inclusiveness in the Chinese context. While this resonates with previous 
scholars that emphasize the importance of Confucian values of authority, obedience and 
harmony rather than individual expression in China (e.g. Gamer 2008; Christiansen and Rai 
1996), it is in considerable contrast with findings in the West as well as some the core idea of ǮAlternative Food Networksǯ. 
Calls to ǲfocus on [the] common interestǳ ȋGould ʹͲͳͷȌ also begs questions about what this 
implies. Across our interviews and consistent with previous studies within and beyond Chinaǯs ǮAlternative Food Networksǯ (Si et al. 2014; Scott et al. 2014; Wang et al. 2014; Klein 2011) we 
found a dominant consequential focus on monetary, health and other individual interests with 
limited orientation towards societal benefits of rural development, environmental protection or other ǲcollectiveǳ aims (Barkema et al. 2015; Tang 2009). This may change as China moves from a focus on subsistence and safety towards other ǮChinese dreamsǯ. Yet, so far, the exact content of 
those dreams and the extent to which they resonate with principles of sustainable development 
remains to be seen. Vitterso et al. (2015) conclude in their recent study on organic consumption 
in Norway that it is important to open up the debate on what constitutes sustainable food 
consumption and production. We would add to this that it is crucial to take into account 
different contextualities within this debate. 
7. Conclusion 
Considering the rising economic, social and environmental importance of Chinese 
consumption and production systems, a better understanding of institutional changes within 
these systems is needed. Our paper focused on a transition towards organic consumption and 
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production. By shifting attention to the notion of legitimacy, we identified barriers for such a 
transition and explored the role of different actors and currently considered strategic 
adjustments in overcoming those barriers.  
We find that in the highly fragmented Chinese agricultural system, perceptions of 
negative consequences associated with the support of the organic scheme are dominant. This 
holds for retailers and manufacturers but especially primary producers, who must make 
considerable adaptations to their practices to align with organic standards. Positive relational 
impacts are promised from the consumption stage but there is currently insufficient evidence of 
a translation of health and food safety concerns into consumer demand for organic produce. This 
partly relates to procedural legitimacy challenges associated with a dominant discourse around 
corrupt certification. These problems have given rise to calls for a tightening of organic labelling 
procedures. Yet the unintended effect of such strategies is additional requirements for 
producers, which negatively affect consequential evaluations for small scale producers and, 
some argue, for society as a whole. As such, an inherent conflict between procedural and 
consequential aspects emerges, which mirrors findings in other sustainability product labelling 
contexts.   
Reconfiguration of the Chinese organic labelling scheme towards more bottom-up 
participatory arrangements offers an alternative way forward. At least for the moment however, ǮAlternative Food Networksǯ are very much inspired by Western values of participation, which 
seem to find limited support in traditional Chinese culture.   
In these circumstances, construction of legitimacy around other principles, in particular 
disposition and regulation, become more relevant. Our analysis highlights an important role for 
government, which can exercise its influence through regulation and its Ǯtaken for grantedǯ 
authoritative position in the field. But for the organic case, this role is not clear cut as 
government must balance the promotion of the organic scheme next to other priorities, 
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including other product labelling schemes, and conflicting objectives within (e.g. food security) 
and beyond (e.g. support for industrial and construction sectors) agriculture.  
Our study illustrates the value of applying concepts of legitimacy to better understand 
current barriers to deeper institutionalisation of the Chinese organic labelling scheme. Many of 
the legitimacy principles identified in Western contexts have been shown to be relevant also in 
the context of the Chinese organic labelling scheme, supporting their ontological positioning on a ǲrealǳ level ȋLeca and Naccache ʹͲͲ͸Ȍ. However, significant differences emerge with regard to 
their interpretation. In particular, procedural norms of deliberation and inclusiveness are much 
less prominent. Dispositional dynamics, in the Chinese context mainly associated with a strong 
traditional belief in the authority of central government rather than the exemplariness of NGOs, 
are of greater importance. Further research should establish to what extent these findings could 
help to understand better also other institutional processes in China.  
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Appendix 1 
No  Actor Group Date  Location Recording Language Position 
1 Academia 27.2.14 Beijing Yes English Postgraduate Student 
2 Academia 31.3.14 Hohhot Yes Mandarin Professor 
3 Academia 19.1.14 Harbin Yes English Postdoctoral Researcher 
4 Academia 27.2.14 Beijing Yes English Professor 
5 Certification Organisation 23.5.14 
Biofach 
Shanghai No English Project Assistant 
6 Certification Organisation 25.11.13 
Beijing 
Organic Fair Yes Mandarin Office Director 
7 Certification Organisation 28.11.14 Beijing Yes English Manager/Senior Inspector 
8 Certification Organisation 28.2.14 Beijing Yes English Project engineer 
9 Certification Organisation 17.1.14 Beijing 
Email 
Response Mandarin No information 
10 Certification Organisation 22.11.13 
Beijing 
Organic Fair Yes Mandarin/English Regional Manager 
11 Certification Organisation 28.2.14 Beijing Yes Mandarin/English Deputy General Manager  
12 Certification Organisation 28.2.14 Beijing Yes Mandarin/English General Manager 
13 Certification Organisation 22.1.14 Harbin No Mandarin Certifier 
14 Certification Organisation 12.1.14 Hangzhou Yes English Technical Manager 
15 
Labelling/Governmental 
Organisation  17.1.14 Beijing Yes Mandarin Director  
16 
Labelling/Governmental 
Organisation 27.2.14 Beijing Yes Mandarin 
Director of personnel certification department;  
Secretary general 
17 
Labelling/Governmental 
Organisation 17.1.13 Beijing No Mandarin Director 
18 Governmental Organisation 24.1.14 Harbin No Mandarin Government Official  
19 
Labelling/Governmental 
Organisation 11.3.14 Nanjing Yes Mandarin Research Fellow 
20 
Labelling/Governmental 
Organisation  11.3.14 Nanjing Yes Mandarin Deputy Director 
21 NGO 11.3.14 
Beijing 
Organic Fair Yes Mandarin Project manager 
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22 NGO 27.2.14 Beijing No English Climate and energy campaigner 
23 NGO 26.12.14 Shanghai Yes Mandarin Founder  
24 NGO 21.10.13 
Shanghai 
Organic Fair Yes Mandarin Editor 
25 Multinational Manufacturer  6.11.13 Telephone yes English Senior Food Safety Manager 
26 Multinational Manufacturer  22.5.14 
Shanghai 
Biofach Yes English Global Sales Manager 
27 
Multinational Manufacturer 
and Producer 24.1.13 Harbin No English Founder  
28 Multinational Manufacturer  3.9.14 Manchester Yes German Export Director 
29 Manufacturer and Producer 11.3.14 Changzhou No Mandarin Manager 
30 Manufacturer and Producer 28.3.14 Hohhot No Mandarin Quality Manager in charge of certification 
31 Manufacturer and Producer 23.3.14 Hohhot Yes Mandarin Vice President 
32 Manufacturer and Producer 27.1.14 Harbin No Mandarin Manager in charge of organic 
33 Manufacturer and Producer 27.3.14 Telephone Yes Mandarin Senior Manager  
34 Manufacturer and Producer 27.3.14 Hohhot No Mandarin General Manager Quality Control 
35 Manufacturer and Producer 26.2.14 Shandong Yes Mandarin Vice President 
36 Manufacturer and Producer 26.2.14 Shandong Yes Mandarin Processing Manager  
37 Manufacturer and Producer 26.2.14 Shandong Yes Mandarin Certification Manager  
38 Manufacturer and Producer 30.12.13 Shanghai Yes Mandarin Sales Chief Inspector  
39 Manufacturer and Producer 23.5.14 
Biofach 
Shanghai Yes Mandarin Executive Consultant 
40 Manufacturer and Producer 25.5.13 
Biofach 
Shanghai No Mandarin Sales Manager 
41 Manufacturer and Producer 25.11.13 
Beijing 
Organic Fair Yes Mandarin Sales Advisor 
42 Manufacturer and Producer 25.5.13 
Biofach 
Shanghai No Mandarin Sales Manager 
43 Manufacturer and Producer 23.5.14 
Biofach 
Shanghai Yes Mandarin Marketing Manager 
44 Primary Producer 23.5.14 
Biofach 
Shanghai Yes Mandarin Procurement Manager 
45 Primary Producer 25.11.13 
Beijing 
Organic Fair Yes Mandarin General Manager 
46 Primary Producer 24.1.13 Harbin No Mandarin Cooperative Manager 
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47 Primary Producer 27.1.14 Harbin No Mandarin Cooperative Manager 
48 Primary Producer 21.10.13 
Shanghai 
Organic Fair No Mandarin Cooperative Manager 
49 Primary Producer 28.3.14 Hohhot No Mandarin Cooperative Manager 
50 Primary Producer 25.5.13 
Biofach 
Shanghai No Mandarin Trade Fair Representative  
51 Primary Producer 22.5.14 
Biofach 
Shanghai Yes Mandarin Vice general manager for production 
52 Primary Producer 25.5.13 
Biofach 
Shanghai No Mandarin Trade Fair Representative  
53 Primary Producer 21.11.13 
Beijing 
Organic Fair No Mandarin Trade Fair Representative  
54 Primary Producer 25.5.13 
Biofach 
Shanghai No Mandarin Sales Manager 
55 Primary Producer 25.5.13 
Biofach 
Shanghai No Mandarin Product Manager 
56 Primary Producer 22.5.14 
Biofach 
Shanghai Yes Mandarin Marketing manager 
57 Primary Producer 23.5.14 
Biofach 
Shanghai No Mandarin Trade Fair Representative  
58 Primary Producer 22.11.13 
Beijing 
Organic Fair No Mandarin Sales Manager 
59 Primary Producer 25.11.14 
Beijing 
Organic Fair Yes Mandarin Trade Fair Representative  
60 Primary Producer 25.5.13 
Biofach 
Shanghai No Mandarin Trade Fair Representative  
61 Organic Retailer 19.3.14 Shanghai Yes Mandarin President China 
62 Organic Retailer 23.5.14 
Biofach 
Shanghai No English/German Trade Fair Representative  
63 Retailer 22.3.14 Fudan No English President China 
64 Retailer 6.3.14 Shanghai Yes English Head of quality management  
65 Retailer 6.3.14 Shanghai Yes English Quality Manager 
66 Retailer 23.11.13 Beijing Yes Mandarin/English Director of Sustainable Promotion Department 
67 Retailer 8.11.13 Shanghai Yes Mandarin Department Manager 
68 Retailer 20.5.14 Shanghai Yes English Senior Sustainability Manager 
69 Distributor 23.5.14 Biofach Yes English Brand Supervisor and General Manager 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
 
 37 
Shanghai  
70 Distributor 24.5.14 
Biofach 
Shanghai No English Trade Fair Representative  
71 Distributor 29.3.14 Hohhot Yes Mandarin/English Trade Fair Representative  
72 Distributor 24.5.14 
Biofach 
Shanghai Yes English Trade Fair Representative  
73 Distributor 25.5.13 
Biofach 
Shanghai No Mandarin Trade Fair Representative  
74 
International Umbrella 
Organisation  5.6.13 Shanghai No English Asia Representative 
Informal Conversations 
75 Primary producer 7.6.13 Beijing  N.a. English No information  
76 Distributor 21.10.13 
Shanghai 
Organic Fair N.a. Mandarin General Manager 
77 Primary producer 25.11.14 
Shanghai 
Farmers 
Market N.a. English Sales Director 
78 Primary producer 16.6.13 Shanghai N.a. English Director of Agriculture 
79 Primary producer 27.2.14 Shandong N.a. Mandarin Manager Large Scale Farm 
80 Manufacturer 22.5.14 
Biofach 
Shanghai  N.a. English Trade Fair Representative  
81 Trader 22.5.14 
Biofach 
Shanghai  N.a. Mandarin Trade Fair Representative  
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Appendix 2  
AFN Alternative Food Networks 
CNCA Accreditation Administration of the Peopleǯs Republic of China  
CSA Community Supported Agriculture 
COFCC China Organic Food Certification Centre 
FIBL Research Institute of Organic Agriculture 
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development  
IFOAM International Federation for Organic Agricultural Movement  
ITC International Trade Centre 
MEP Ministry of Environmental Protection  
OFDC Organic Food Development Centre  
OFRC Organic Food Research and Consulting Centre 
PGS Participatory Guarantee Systems 
SEPA State Environment Protection Agency  
USDA United States Department of Agriculture 
 
 
